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Hope( s) after Genocide 
. * 
Margaret Urban Walker 
In a news story on the unveiling of a monument to commemorate the 
Armenian Genocide in a public space in Canada, the monument's creator, 
the sculptor Arto Tchakmakdjian is reported to have said that the meaning of 
the monument is hope. 1 The idea of a genocide monument whose theme is 
hope can strike one in different ways. Some will find it apt and powerfully 
moving; others might find it presumptuous, treacly, obscene, or simply irrele-
vant. And it is incomplete: whose hope, and for what? 
The affective vocabulary in writing on the aftermath of genocide, 
especially with respect to survivors, is elaborate on the negative side: fear, 
terror, shame, humiliation, sadness, and despair; anger, rage, hatred, resent-
ment, indignation, outrage, and vengefulness; pessimism, suspicion, 
mistrust, skepticism, and cynicism. The positive side of the ledger is meager, 
sa~e for a focus on rebuilding trust and a fascination with forgiveness and 
mercy. Building or rebuilding trust is central to many accounts of social 
reconstruction and reconciliation. It is widely accepted that commonplace 
forms of trust in institutions and other people will be shaken or destroyed for 
survivors of mass violence and severe repression, and that establishing stable 
societal conditions between individuals and groups and viable and legiti-
mate political institutions will require trust to be created or revived. 
Following the Christian ethos with which South Africa's transitional process 
My thanks to the convenors, Johannes Lang and Thomas Brudholm, and fellow participants at 
the "Uproar of Emotion" conference (Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen) 
for cha1lenging and very helpful discussion of a draft of this paper. I thank also participants at 
"The Nature and Norms of Hope" conference (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY) and the 
conveners, Andrew Chignell and Samuel Newlands, for another opportunity to discuss these 
ideas. 
1 Cited in "Genocide Monument in Canada Inaugurated,'' AsbarezArmenian News (October 21, 
2013). 
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was aggressively (but not uncontroversially) imbued, forgiveness became 
a prime topic concerning post-conflict contexts. Forgiveness and mercy are 
often urged upon survivors; their anger or terror, their grief and despair, and 
their justified hunger for accountability, reparation, punishment, or ven-
geance may be seen as obstacles to recreating stable and normal social and 
political relationships. 
I want to think about hope, which I believe must be a central affective 
resource in the aftermath of genocide, despite the lack of thematic attention it 
seems to have received. 2 I begin with the central role for hope in the aftermath 
of grave wrongs that I argued in my book Moral Repair, extending widely the 
range of hopes that might be critical in the wake of genocide. 3 I then examine 
some sources of hesitation in introducing hope into a discussion of the 
affective landscape of genocide's aftermath. Some of these sources stem 
from confusion about the nature of hope, while others reflect certain assump-
tions about genocide. In the first category, there are misunderstandings and 
disputes about the nature of hope. For example, it is harder to attribute the 
possibility (much less the necessity) of hope to survivors of genocide if hope is 
confused with optimism; but hope is not optimism. In the second category, 
one may hesitate morally to speak of hope in the context of genocide if one 
thinks it presumptuous or cruel. In this connection, I will discuss Lawrence 
Langer's warning against redemptive interpretations of Holocaust survivors' 
· experiences. Alternatively, one might assume that no basis remains for ordin-
ary hope in the wake of the "crime of crimes," so that only a special kind of 
superordinate' hope can remain. I consider in this regard Jonathan Lear's 
claim that a kind of decimation and cultural devastation, as occurred to 
· Native peoples in North America, can reveal the role of "radical hope." 
I argue that these views are too · constrained for the varied experiences of 
survivors of genocide and for the varied roles of hope even ( or especially) in 
that context. 
2 Ervin Staub, Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict, and Terrorism (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) is a massive compendium of recent research and intervention in 
the aftermath of genocide, but contains no entry on hope in the index. Neither does Genocide, 
Risk and Resilience: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Bert Ingelaere, Stephan Parmentier, 
Jacques Haers, and Barbara Segaert (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) index hope or 
include any articles with hope as a principal theme. Tzvetan Todorov has written powerfully on 
the Holocaust and mass violence, but even his book Hope and Memory: Lessons from the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) contains no thematic 
attention to hope. A striking exception that I will discuss is Jonathan Lear's Radical Hope: 
Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
3 Margaret Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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HOPE AFTER VIOLENT WRONGDOING 
In Moral Repair, I asserted a fundamental and indispensable role for hope in the 
aftermath of grave wrongs involving mass violence, violent state repression, and 
intergenerational oppression and injustice.4 I argued that hope is such a central 
good in human life that careless or intentional destruction of hope is itself 
a profound moral wrong. I further argued for the importance in repairing moral 
relationships of restoring hope and trust after wrongdoing. Hope and trust are 
essential aspects of working moral relationships. Building trust has received 
significant attention as a core requirement of post-conflict or post-iepression 
reconstruction.5 Hope, I believe, is more fundamental than trust, because hope 
alone creates conditions in which trust in shared moral standards and others' 
responsiveness to them, however tentative, might be regained, or at least enter-
tained and tested, after being destroyed. In trusting, we rely on others, or on 
institutions or environments, to behave as they should, given norms we assume are 
shared and the normative expectations they foster. In moderately stable condi-
tions, one more ot less expects those trusted to behave as they should or to stand 
accountable for their failures to meet normative expectations. One feels entitled to 
their compliance and holds them responsible to comply or stand accountable.6 
In the case of serious wrongdoing and mass violence, victims find that other 
individuals, members of particular groups, and public officials and institutions 
engage in hostile, intentionally destructive, and murderous acts with an 
attitude of justification or impunity, utterly betraying victims' trust in shared 
moral standards and in others' acceptance of responsibility under these stan-
dards. In the same context, many others stand by in active or passive compli-
city' with abusive and violent treatment of those targeted. Indeed, it is a striking 
fact in the literature on genocide that complicity, failures to aid, and failures to 
stand with the victims in demanding accountability in the aftermath of 
violence are often experienced by victims as an outrage distinct from, and in 
some cases more wounding than, the primary violent injury.7 These failures 
4 Walker, Moral Repair, 40-71. 
See Pablo de Greiff, "Theorizing Transitional Justice," in Transitional Justice, Nomos 51, ed. 
M. S. Williams, et al. (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2012), 31-77; 
Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); and Walker, Moral Repair. Passing references that assume the centrality 
of trust are numerous in work on transitional justice and the aftermath of mass violence and 
conflict, including genocide. 
6 Walker, Moral Repair, 72-98. 
7 On the "second wound" when others do not recognize one's victimization, see Ronnie Janoff-
Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (New York, NY: Free 
Press, 1992), 147 (who attributes the idea to Martin Symonds); Yael Danieli, "Introduction," in 
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signify an absence of basic regard and a civic and moral abandonment of 
victims. 
If there is any chance. in the aftermath of violence for the creation or 
reinvestment of trust, victims must have a sense that reasonably safe reliance 
on others vital to shared life is at least possible in the future . And it will require 
enough motivation on the part of those injured to permit and test some forms 
of renewed connection, perhaps even with those who are members of the 
group that engaged in violent wrongdoing or at least with a social environment 
that has proven it can turn indifferent or malignant. This is the signature 
configuration of hope: a desire that some perceived good come to realization; 
a belief that it is at least ( even if only barely) possible; and an alert openness to, 
absorption in, or active pursuit of the desired possibility. It is hope for moral 
reconstruction, for a basis to believe in shared standards and the trustworthi-
ness of others - and that is to say, for a reasonably stable human life with 
others - that creates conditions in which trust might be regenerated through 
an openness to reconnection ( even if selective) and possible reliance on the 
trustworthiness of others ( even if sharply limited). 
In Moral Repair, I was concerned primarily with the nature of functioning 
moral relations in order to understand what in them is damaged or destroyed 
by wrongdoing, and so what is required in creating these relationships anew 
after grave wrongs. Moral reconstruction must spur hopes that others with 
whom victims must live and environments and institutions upon which they 
must rely might again become minimally trustworthy; without these hopes, 
opportunities to build trust are unavailable . The massive destruction of 
many different kinds of important hopes, however, is also a consequence of 
· 'mass violence and is often an intentional aim of it. The lives of victims will 
be devastated in numerous ways. So the need for hope in the aftermath of 
mass violence will involve not only what is needed to reconstruct functioning 
moral relationships but what is needed to go on in individual lives and 
communities. 
The many impacts of hope-crushing violence cannot be exhaustively 
detailed, but genocide scholars identify some predictably recurring ones. 
The. permanent physical wounds of torture, mutilation, severe deprivation, 
and physical attack are joined to devastating losses of family and other loved 
ones, the terror of experiencing or witnessing mass atrocity, and, in some cases, 
the extreme degradation involved in physical survival in captivity, hiding, or 
International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma, ed. Y. Danieli (New York, 
NY: Plenum Press, 1998), 1-17, here 7; and Walker, Moral Repair, 2er-21. 
Hope(s) afoer Genocide 215 
flight, a common theme of survivor testimonies. The social psychologist and 
Holocaust survivor Ervin Staub, who has studied genocides and other mass 
violence for decades in different locales from the Holocaust to Rwanda, points 
to such common psychological and interpersonal effects as a diminished sense 
of self; feelings of danger and threat; mistrust, fear, avoidance, hostility, and 
aggression; and "seeing the world as unjust."8 Staub observes that "People feel 
vulnerable, the world looks dangerous to them, and other people, especially 
those outside their group, seem untrustworthy."9 Henry Theriault points, in 
addition to staggering material losses of home, land, and property, to geno-
cide's effects on the victim group of "poverty, the military vulnerability of their 
group, ... the fragmented and tenuous nature of their post-genocide group 
identity, their geopolitical marginality, the long-term effects of trauma, inter-
nalised feelings of shame and unworthiness, lack of faith in the justness of 
human society and more," effects which may persist down generations.10 
Especially, although perhaps not uniquely, in the case of genocide, survi-
vors speak of a loss of trust in "the world" or in "life itself." Jean Amery said of 
his torture in a German prison in Belgium, that the first blow brings about 
a loss of "trust in the world," which he links to a failure of anticipated "respect" 
and "the expectation of help."n It is a loss he regards as "indelible."12 For 
Amery, it was never over: 'Twenty-two years later I am still dangling over the 
ground by dislocated arms, panting, and accusing myself."13 Lawrence Langer 
recounts Holocaust testimonies that return repeatedly to the theme of 
a catastrophic and irreversible experience of betrayal. Survivors say they 
"don't feel at home in the world" after "really knowing the truth about people, 
h~man nature, about death ... ," or how it "doesn't make any sense ... To go 
on and on after you know what the world is like or what it was.m4 Survivor Julia 
8 Staub, Overcoming Evil, 275. 
9 Ervin Staub, Laurie A. Pearlman, Alexandra Gubin, and Athanase Hagengimana, "Healing, 
Reconciliation; Forgiving and the Prevention of Violence after Genocide or Mass Killing: 
An Intervention and Its Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda," foumal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology 24, no. 3 (2005 ), 297-334, here 300. 
10 Henry C . Theriault, "Shared Burdens and Perpetrator-Victim Group Conciliation," in 
Genocide, Risk and Resilience, ed. Ingelaere et al. , 98-107, here 103. 
11 Jean Amery, At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities 
[ 1966], transl. S. Rosenfeld and S. P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1980), 28. 
12 Amery, At the Mind's Limits, 34. '3 Amery, At the Mind's Limits, 36. 
14 The survivor who says "you don't feel at home in the world" is Hedda K. See Lawrence 
L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1991), 35. Irene W. speaks of the "total world view ... of extreme pessimism" of "really 
knowing the truth a bout people" (59). Leo G . speaks of the senselessness of knowing "what the 
world is like" (147). 
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S. says, ''You're not supposed to see this; it doesn't go with life."15 Bessie K., 
whose infant was seized on a train says, "To me, I was dead. I died," and 
Michael R. says, "So there's no tomorrow, really ... m 6 
Jean Hatzfeld's remarkable · collection of survivor interviews in post-
genocide Rwanda sounds similar themes. A sense of degradation lingers for 
some after surviving by doing what they had to do. Witnesses speak of "the 
defilement of a bestial existence" in "being hunted like a game animal."17 
Francine Niyitegeka, who is "never at peace," says she "saw herself in muddy 
detail as a corpse in the papyrus lying among all the others. "18 Innocent 
Rwililiza explains that "The more you tell of your survival, the more you run 
yourself down in others' eyes.m9 The loss of trust - in other human beings, in 
any moral rules or values, or in the world - is even more evident. Even as 
survivors acknowledge the necessity of resuming life alongside those who 
killed, they say, "recovering trust ... that's done for"; " ... trust is unthinkable 
in the future"; "[t]he missing twenty percent ... is trust"; and "I expect 
betrayal."20 The sense that morality itself is entirely precarious is captured by 
Berthewan Mwanankabandi: 11 ••• I used to think about good and evil ... 
honorable effort, decent behavior, the strait [sic] and narrow path. In the 
marshes I learned that any · belief can vanish on a first morning of 
machetes ... "21 Claudine Kayitesi sums up the loss of trust in life itself: "Life 
betrayed me. To be betrayed by your neighbors, by the authorities, by the 
Whites - that is a staggering blow. But to be betrayed by life ... who can bear 
that? It's too much. You lose all sense of where the right direction lies."22 
Could there · yet be room, much less an important role, for hope in these 
unimaginably abysmal conditions of survival? To think about this, some 
darity about hope is needed. 
HOPE: FROM ACTIVE PURSUIT TO PATIENT ABIDING 
' My account of hope in Moral Repair begins with the commonplace that hope, 
whatever else it involves, requires a desire for a state of affairs and a belief that it 
is possible, although at present uncertain. Hope is oriented toward the 
15 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, 136. · 
16 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, 173. On a variety of psychosocial effects that might be the 
results of direct experience of genocide, see Blustein, this volume. 
17 Jean Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy: Living in Rwanda after the Genocide, transl. 
L. Coverdale (New York, NY: Picador, 2009), 6 and 102. 
18 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 234 and 235. 19 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 89. 
20 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 203,207,209, and 229. 
21 Hatzfeld, The Antelop(s Strategy, 232-233. 22 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 7. 
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realization of some possible state of affairs to which the world is still open, to 
what is not yet decided from the perspective of the one hoping. To these three 
typically acknowledged features - desire, possibility, futurity - I added effi-
cacy. In hoping, we believe that something is possible, although perhaps just 
barely so. We desire that it actually come to be the case, unlike transient 
desires or desires for things we do not approve of and to which we don't attach 
ourselves. In addition, we are moved in thought, imagination, feeling, and 
expression toward the anticipation or achievement of the desired situation. 
Hope is complex in the variety of ways that we can "bend" toward the world in 
the manner of hoping. In hoping, we can muse or plan or take purposeful 
action. We can proliferate scenarios that lead to what is hoped for and 
imaginatively dwell on what its realization will mean or be like, searching 
for effective means, recruiting assistance, or biding our time in patient alert-
ness. What we hope for can engage us in mild- absorption or intense longing 
that can be heartening or blissful but also anxious or fearful. I describe hoping 
as a "patterned syndrome" of varied and shifting combinations of ways we are 
engaged and moved by the world when we believe something is possible, we 
desire its realization, and the world appears to us open to its realization.23 
Hope, then, is an affective attitude registered and expressed in multiform 
cognitive, emotional , practical, and expressive ways that engages us toward 
the actual future realization of (and not merely wishing for) something we 
value.24 
In Moral Repair, I was drawn to explore hope because of the depth of 
damage to hopes recounted by survivors of genocide and other mass violence, 
but also by the astonishing power of hope to sustain people's attachment to life 
in 'punishingly bleak conditions and in circumstances of excruciating power-
lessness and overwhelming destruction of what people most value or of every-
thing they value. It is important to understand hope in a way that explains its 
power not only when we can be moved by it to purposeful action but also how 
it can engage us in a world that seems to have preempted or already defeated 
any effort we could possibly make. Much of what we hope for in both everyday 
life and at the extremes is either not open fully or not open at all to our own 
efforts. As Victoria McGeer's and Stan van Hooft's accounts of hope stress, 
hope embodies a sense of both our agency and its inherent limitations.25 Our 
2
3 Walker, Moral Repair, 44-49. 
24 I discuss the (not always precise) distinction between wishing and hoping in Moral Repair, 53. 
Stan van Hooft, Hope (Durham, NC: Acumen, 2011), 19--27, gives an extended and useful 
treatment of what differentiates hoping from wishing. 
25 Victoria McGeer, "The Art of Good Hope," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science: Hope, Power, and Governance 592, no. 1 (2004), 100-127; van Hooft, Hope. 
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imagination allows us to see possibilities that draw, galvanize, and direct our 
attention, but many of which are not open to our own efforts, or to the efforts of 
others, known or unknown. Many possibilities for which we hope are realiz-
able only by chance occ:urrence. 
Hope permeates agency, but this does not mean that hopes only engage us 
in planning and purposeful effort.26 There are many hopes in which we 
"dwell" and others that we act to realize. As McGeer nicely puts it, hoping 
has us "actively confronting, exploring, and sometimes patiently biding our 
limitations as agents."27 This point matters: if we think of hoping too much in 
terms of action, we not only fail to grasp the full range of hopes, but we are 
apt to assume that hopes must have objects well-defined enough to be suited 
to planning and purposeful pursuit. This might in turn suggest that we need to 
postulate a distinctive kind of hope that is different in kind - existential, 
pre-intentional, or radical - for cases where the object of hope is obscure or 
hardly defined. But while what is hoped for may be a quite specific state of 
affairs on which we fix with laser-like precision, it can also be diffuse to the 
point of believing, as the title of a Stephen Sondheim song has it, that "some-
thing's coming." The anticipatory orientation created by hope can in some 
cases be less a fine-grained cognitive exercise than an affective restlessness or 
a patient biding with an eye to some aspect of the future. 
The rich cognitive repertory of hope is one of its striking features. Hoping is 
constituted in part by configurations of perception, attention, thought, imagi-
nation, and feeling that mentally open and hold open in the mind the space of 
possibility, that experiment with the imagined experience of what is hoped for, 
and where appropriate that explore and assess avenues for effort. Cheshire 
. Calhoun captures this when she attributes to hope cognitive patterns of 
"previsaging" the content of a particular successful future in which hopes 
are fulfilled, a mode of reflective imagination with motivational effects that 
"second" the motivating reasons we already have for our commitments.28 
Philip Pettit sees hope as involving "cognitive resolve," an ability to view the 
hoped-for state "as if' it were in fact going to obtain, thus buoying confidence 
26 Adrienne M. Martin rejects the "agential investment" view of hope, in which hope involves 
"setting an end or goal" for action. Martin misreads my own view as an example, but my 
characterization of hope is explicitly concerned with hopes in situations of overwhelming or 
helpless exposure to threat and loss. See A. M. Martin, "Hopes and Dreams," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 83, no . 1 (2011), 148-173, here 152. 
2
7 McGeer, "The Art of Good Hope," 104. 
28 Cheshire Calhoun, "Motivating Hope," in Doing Valuable Time: The Present, the Future, and 
Meaningful Living (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
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while suspending blow-by-blow rational assessment of evidence, risk, and 
reward. 29 
The precise nature of the efficacy of hope, its seeming power to energize 
and motivate, remains little understood, even while the association of hope 
with feelings of elevation or buoyancy is deep, historically and phenomen-
ologically. One experimental psychologist, Richard Davidson, sees in hope 
not only a cognitive "marshaling of information," but also "affective forecast-
ing - that is, the comforting, energizing, elevating feeling that you experience 
when you project in your mind a positive future." 30 Hope's characteristic 
cognitive activities can evoke present and anticipatory feelings or'relief, joy, 
excitement, gratitude, and pleasure, should what is hoped for come to pass, 
and these emotions might provide some of hope's momentum. It is possible 
that hope has its own affective surge that steers thought, or that hope is the 
cognitive handmaiden to independently motivating desires, as in Calhoun's 
"phenomenological idea of the future ," where it is the expectation of being 
successful that adds motivational heft. 31 It is also possible that cognitive activity 
and feeling interact and influence each other in producing the state we 
identify as hoping. 32 The conception of hope as a complex interaction of 
emotional and cognitive states seems to best capture how hope is both 
identified and experienced. For my purposes here, though, it is enough to 
accept a strong tie between the cognitive shaping and affective energy that 
obtains in instances we identify as hope. 
To recap, several general points bear on thinking about hope after genocide. 
Hope involves a belief in the possibility, however slight, of something one 
desires to see realized, together with an awareness of its uncertainty. You 
c~nnot hope for what is either impossible or certain; and if you are sure that 
what you desire will come true, you have gone beyond hoping for it to 
expecting it. What we hope for must be possible, but it may be just barely 
so. In this way hope is constrained by reality and evidence, unlike wishful 
thinking or blind faith ; yet the epistemic bar hope sets is low, in that bare 
possibility renders a situation apt for hoping. This is one reason that hope can 
be a bulwark against despair or a spur to creativity. Hope can empower 
planning and striving, but it need not do so, or be able to do so; where hope 
29 Philip Pettit, "Hope and Its Place in Mind," Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science: Hope, Power, and Governance 592, no. 1 (2004), 152-165. 
3o Davidson is cited in Jerome Groopman, The Anatomy of Hope: How People Prevail in the Face 
of Illness (New York, NY: Random House, 2004), 193. Groopman discusses the uncertain 
biology of hope in relation to placebo effects, expectation of relief or reward, tempering fear, 
and resilience (161- 207) . 
3' Calhoun, "Motivating Hope." 32 Groopman, The Anatomy of Hope , 193-194. 
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is not agential in the narrow sense, it will still shape thought, spur imagination, 
steer attention, and prompt feeling. Hope's object-what we hope for- may be 
(but need not be) well-defined enough to support planning and purposeful 
effort; in many cases, what we hope for is not open to purposeful pursuit. Hope 
is cognitively rich; it can take the form of resolve to treat what is desired "as if' 
likely, but it can create agility, flexibility, and resilience in adapting to 
changing conditions and evidence. While hope requires sophisticated 
cognitive operations, it is widely associated with emotional properties of 
elevation, energy, or buoyancy, creating or adding momentum to desires 
and commitments. Hope's emotional momentum might be decisive in cases 
of great risks, long odds, or former defeats and losses. 
Finally, many philosophers, myself included, are led to conclude that hope, 
far from being a special affective resource primarily for adversity or extremity, 
is in fact ubiquitous in human life and plays a foundational role. Pettit notes 
that hope sustains both collective action, which requires cooperation under 
uncertainty, and interpersonal relations, which are supported by a belief, often 
enough disappointed, that others are responsive to reasons. 33 McGeer believes 
hope is inseparable from our agential interest in the future, a "grounding force 
of human agency. "34 van Hooft locates hope in the "gap" between effort and 
outcome that exists in the vulnerability of all our actions to bad luck and 
mishap, a fact we necessarily learn early and that is relentlessly confirmed.35 
In my own view, if the trust at the heart of minimal moral relations requires 
hope, then hope is the root of a life lived among others seen as responsive and 
responsible actors rather than objects to fear and avoid or to manipulate, 
coerce, or overpower. And that is to say that hope is at the root of 
a .distinctively human form oflife mediated by norms and values, just as it is 
essentially, like memory, threaded through the lives of human subjects who 
live not in a timeless present but in light of our pasts and for our futures. 
The ubiquity of hope underscores how catastrophic the loss of hope can be, 
and how abhorrent is its willful destruction. 
RESISTANCE TO HOPE AFTER GENOCIDE: "TAMING ATROCITY" 
I am not alone in seeing hope as one of the most powerful human needs and 
powers in response to suffering, a-dversity, and devastation. Psychologists are 
interested in the nature and bounds of resilience and supporting interventions, 
even in the wake of atrocity. But one might worry that hope is out of place in 
33 Pettit, "Hope and Its Place in Mind," 163-164. 34 McGeer, "The Art of Good Hope," 101. 
35 van Hooft, Hope, 32. 
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speaking of genocide, and that references to it are dangerously complacent, 
offensively irrelevant, or unintentionally cruel when confronting "the epitome 
of the irreparable."36 Is a concern with hope presumptuous and insulting? 
In this section, I will consider how discussion of hope in the aftermath of 
genocide may be chastened or silenced by the idea that hope is lik~ly to be out 
of place in comprehending the aftermath of genocide. In response, I suggest 
that to speak of hope after genocide could be, but ·need not be, irrelevant or 
irresponsible. It is easier to think this if one fails to understand certain features 
of hope or to recognize the varieties of genocide experience as well as 
differences among individuals. 
To bring these worries into focus, I tum to Lawrence L. Langer's Holocaust 
Testimonies, a landmark in the literature on Holocaust survivor experiences. 
Langer cautions us about a certain anxious eagerness to avert our eyes and ears 
from the full reality of the enduring devastation in survivors' lives. Langer's 
point is about what we are or aren't hearing in the testimony, but this caution 
might tempt those speaking about atrocities and their sequels to avoid all 
seemingly "redemptive" discourses by which "the horror of the atrocity is 
tamed."37 Through close reading of testimonies, Langer explores the unbear-
able burdens of memory and the ruptures in self-understanding that persist in 
light of an experience that survivors never leave behind and yet find unbelie-
vable, anticipating that others will not understand. Langer's examination of 
layers of unlivable memory is framed by a warning. He admonishes us, the 
listeners or readers, to avoid any hint of celebrating "the resourceful human 
spirit."38 The impulse to redeem, to find edification, to render survival an 
h~roic odyssey, is cast by Langer not only as a disrespectful falsehood, but as 
evidence of a refusal of understanding that survivors themselves anticipate and 
routinely suffer. "Our needful ears" are not only uncomprehending, but 
36 I borrow this phrase from Joelle Hecker, "The Meaning of Monetary Reparations after 
a Genocide: The German-Jewish Case in the Early 1950s," in Genocide, Risk and 
Resilience: An Indisciplinary Approach, ed. B. Ingelaere et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 190-201, here 190. In saying this, Hecker obviously does not think that 
genocide requires no reparation. 
37 Jennifer L. Geddes, "Religious Rhetoric in Responses to Atrocity," in The Religious in 
Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Thomas Brudholm and 
Thomas Cushman (New York, :NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 21-37, here 28. 
Geddes is concerned specifically with religious languages in their apophatic and redemptive 
uses; many people hear discourses about hope (or forgiveness ) as implicitly religious, 
a tendency I do not address in this essay. 
38 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, xi. Primo Levi , The Drowned and the Saved [1986], transl. 
R. Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1989) remains a masterpiece of difficult reflection on what can 
and cannot be told and the difficulties of comprehension both in and after the events. 
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unintentionally cruel in isolating survivors. 39 In a pointedly admonitory pre-
face , Langer contrasts the testimony of a couple, survivors of Auschwitz and 
several other camps, with their daughter's feelings about her parents' experi-
ence. Mrs. B. confesses, "We are left with loneliness. As long as we live, we are 
lonely," while their daughter sees her parents as people who have "managed to 
build a life afterwards and still have some hope:"40 Langer comments that "all 
of them were telling a version of the truth as they grasped it," but the passage is 
meant to accentuate the dissonance between the survivors' own discourse and 
their daughter's perception. Commenting on this exemplary instance, Langer 
says that "the losses they record raise few expectations of renewal or hopes of 
reconciliation"; although he immediately adds that "this does not mean that 
witnesses have no future" but that their futures are "hostages to a humiliating 
and painful past."41 
Jean Hatzfeld's interviews, too, record eerie reports that survival can mean 
life without, in some sense, a future. Ms. Kayitesi, who now is married and has 
children and land to farm, says that she is grateful. Yet, "the future has already 
been eaten up by what I lived through."42 "But for me, the chance to become 
someone is over," despite her good fortune; her second life "will be half a life, 
because of the complete break."43 Berthe Mwanankabandi, too, says, "All the 
things I expected in my first life - I cannot find them anymore in my second." 
Most poignant is the concreteness with which she describes losing a taste for 
life, like the ripe bananas she used to love: "We also promised ourselves that if 
we survived, we would throw ourselves full tilt into every endeavor from then 
on ... And that was the first promise forgotten."44 
The searing testimonies studied by Langer and Hatzfeld give full scope to 
· ·the worry that talk of hope might be unseemly, if not insulting. I in no way 
want to deny or minimize the barely conceivable experience of many survivors 
that "doesn't go with life," and the reality of feeling dead, deadened, or 
haunted that evidently persists. If hope is correctly characterized by the four 
features I ~ave emphasized - desire, futurity, possibility, and efficacy - these 
testimonies give stark evidence that genocide can arrest or extinguish precisely 
the forms of perception and feeling, and the experiences of agency, that 
constitute hope. Where desire is deadened, the future seems closed, and no 
relief or restoration seems possi_ble, hope is to that extent absent. For some, 
there may be despair and a loss of the interest or will to go on. A recent survey 
of studies on aging Holocaust survivors, for example, finds a suggestion of 
39 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, xi. 40 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, ix and x-xi. 
41 Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, xi. 42 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 4. 
43 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 6. 44 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 233 and 234. 
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increased risk, perhaps three times the risk, for suicide among Holocaust 
survivors compared to other older people, confounding a certain "myth of 
endurance" that survivors clung to life and would continue to do so.45 Rather 
than despair, there may be an anesthesia, numbness, or a sense · of 
resignation.46 We should assume that mass violence creates risks for psychic 
and moral wounds that may not heal. Yet survivors are individuals with varied 
experiences of genocide and for whom different kinds of hope can give a stake 
in the future. Certain hopes, however local and cautious, are necessary to go 
forward with life, which most survivors in fact do. 
Consider first the revival of ordinary or everyday hopes. For some indivi-
duals, life does again become engaging or specific prospects in life draw them 
forward. The therapist Esther Perel, a child of survivors, says (in an interview 
unrelated to genocide), "There were the ones who did not die and the ones 
who came back to life."47 This is not an evaluative judgment, but rather an 
observation about the fact that genocide survivors fare differently in the after-
math. No doubt, some of the variation is due to different experiences of or in 
a genocide, some to different experiences in the aftermath, and others to 
social, cultural, and individual variations that are not under the control of 
victims. Even among Hatzfeld's disturbing testimonies, there is Sylvie 
Umubyeyi, who says that she lost her taste for life but then "Courage came 
back, and with it that zest for living ... Since I am alive, I cannot get tired of 
living; how could I?" She speaks of "one day" being at peace with herself.48 I do 
not mean here to highlight a stark contrast between despair and buoyancy, but 
to mark the great variation in ways individuals will go on with life. A second 
life post-genocide is a life, and it requires forms of ordinary engagement, but 
neither optimism nor cheer. Hope is not optimism that expects the best, nor 
cheerfulness that makes light of a dreadful past. Nor is hope intrinsically 
heroic, although it can seem miraculous under devastating conditions. 
Hope is a ubiquitous and basic human capacity to orient ourselves practically 
in time, to organize our minds, choices, and lives toward what we value, and to 
experience both the efficacy and the limitations of our agency.49 In hoping, 
one need not assume that everything - or even anything - will tum out well; 
45 Yoram Barak, "The Aging of Holocaust Survivors: Myth and Reality Concerning Suicide," 
Israeli Medical Association Journal 9, no. 3 (2007), 196-198. 
46 Hope has, among its contraries, at least fear and despair. Calhoun's "Motivating Hope" also 
suggests "fretfulness" about one's pursuits that hope calms. 
47 Susan Dominus, "The Sexual Healer," New York Times (January 26, 2014) . 
48 Hatzfeld, The Antelope's Strategy, 231. 
49 Calhoun, "Motivating Hope," is an acute and original discussion of the temporality of hope 
and the role of "the phenomenological idea of the future. " 
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one need only grasp that the future is in some desired respect open to what we 
value and that, in some cases, one's own acts can make a difference to the 
future that comes to be. 
Most human hopes are everyday; through them, we structure our lives, 
enlivening desires and steering attention, imaginings, and plans. Survivors of 
mass violence will be threatened with profound disengagement, or even 
despair, if they cannot reclaim some everyday hopes. These might include 
opportunities for education and employment, for a return home, or to live in 
communities without fear about their group heritage or identity. Of course, 
"everyday life" implies countless mundane hopes for the pleasures of family 
life, good health, good food, good friends, and so on. Some of the 
consequences of genocide will literally put some of these hopes out of reach. 
But responses to genocide, especially in the form of reparations, moral recon-
struction, and peace building, must do more than appreciate the catastrophic 
effect that genocidal violence can have on hopes of survivors. Responses must 
also presume that genocide survivors have needs for hope that they must be 
supported in defining. Hopes not only sustain us; they individuate us. What we 
hope for reveals not only what we want, but who we are in both common and 
distinctive ways: what in particular can absorb our attention, spark our 
imagination, and mobilize our plans and efforts. The picture of survivors as 
uniformly or inevitably dwelling in a netherworld of hopelessness can be as 
. nullifying as misplaced redemptive views. It de-individualizes survivors and 
possibly desensitizes us precisely to the importance of support for survivors to 
reawaken everyday hopes that matter specifically to them after devastating 
experiences. Support for survivors - personal, social, and political - must be 
,designed for the long term that will be needed to reawaken and reorganize 
everyday hopes. It should also address the effects of genocide on later genera-
tions. The need to address transgenerational effects is both for the sake of those 
descendants who cope with legacies of genocide and for survivors themselves, 
for whom the fact that "we are still here" is a pointed and enduring repudiation 
of genocide. 
Two forms of hope appear to have a special role to play for many survivors of 
violence: hope for understanding and hope for justice. "Understanding" and 
"justice" may sound like very abstract ideas, but there is massive evidence that 
these desires can remain intense {or can intensify) over time for survivors and 
become a quest for later generations. Ervin Staub and colleagues report on 
a post-genocide intervention in Rwanda that includes some intriguing obser-
vations regarding hope. The intervention trained community group leaders to 
work through their programs toward healing and mutual acceptance among 
members of Hutu and Tutsi groups. Unusual in this approach was an 
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emphasis on providing information through "psycho-educational lectures" 
and discussions on the causes of genocide, the predictably traumatic effects 
of genocide, and a framework of basic psychological needs that, when fru-
strated, lead to intergroup conflict. The principal finding was that this 
approach reduced trauma symptoms and created positive intergroup orienta-
tion to a greater degree than two other approaches. The investigators also note 
that although there is "relatively little tradition" for the use of infonnation 
about the origins of violence, it appeared to have "emotional meaning" for 
participants; they were moved to realize that the horror of their experience 
might be a comprehensible, even predictable, outcome of human processes 
"rather than of incomprehensible evil," a realization that "gave participants 
hope" for preventing future violence. 50 The investigators also believe that 
understanding trauma and healing "depathologizes" problems and gives 
hope for healing. 51 
It has often been said that in the aftermath of violence and repression, what 
matters goes beyond knowledge to acknowledgment. Yet often knowledge, 
ranging from factual information to explanatory frameworks, answers a deep 
need. This need is widely recognized in the practice of restorative justice in 
criminal contexts and it is demonstrated in the rapid evolution of the concept 
of a "right to truth" about human rights crimes.52 Demands for truth recovery 
about political violence endure for decades. The hope that the truth will yet be 
known and acknowledged can be sustaining, whether in active pursuit or in 
patient waiting. 
Finally, there are the equally persistent moral hopes, ranging from the hope 
for justice in the aftermath of the genocide to hopes for a more decent society 
in.the future. "Hopes for justice," however, can mean many different things. 
A descendant of survivors of the Armenian genocide comments, "Like many 
Armenians outside Turkey, I grew up in an atmosphere where the desire for 
revenge was not always easy to separate from the desire for justice."53 It is 
50 Staub et al., "Healing, Reconciliation," 327-328. 
5
' Staub et al., "Healing, Reconciliation," 304-305. 
52 On restorative justice, see Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice 
(Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1995), 19-29. On the right to truth, see Juan E. Mendez, 
· "The Human Right to the Truth: Lessons Learned from Latin American Experiences with 
Truth Telling," in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict 
Societies, ed. Tristan A. Borer (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 
115-150; and Margaret U. Walker, "Post-conflict Truth Telling: Exploring Extended 
Territory," in Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International Law, ed. Larry May and Andrew 
Forcehimes (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11-31. 
53 Raffi Khatchadourian, "Letter from Turkey: fi.. Century of Silence," The New Yorker 
(January 5, 2015) , 32-53, here 44. 
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certainly true that desires by some victims and descendants for what they see 
and deeply feel as justice in the aftermath of terrible violence may not be ones 
that others - or even they themselves in cooler moments - can morally 
endorse. Victims can be .mistaken or wrongheaded in what they perceive to 
be justice and so may not be morally entitled to what they hope for. Nor is it 
guaranteed that well-grounded justice claims of victims will trump all other 
moral considerations, as continuing debates on "peace vs. justice" illustrate. 
Still, wrong-headed or perverse ideas of justice, as much as defensible and 
paradigmatic ones, organize strong, deep, and persistent hopes in the wake of 
violence. 54 In addition, the hopes of victims for justice often take entirely 
recognizable and legitimate forms: restitution of lost land and property; 
compensation for unrecoverable losses, suffering, and indignity; accountabil-
ity or punishment of responsible actors; acknowledgment of wrongs, apolo-
gies, and an accurate historical record; reform or transformation of corrupt or 
repressive societal institutions; or more just distributions of resources, oppor-
tunities, and respect. Victims' hopes for justice may vary considerably in 
context, with diverse perceptions of what measures signify justice to them 
and with different priorities among such measures; this has become, properly, 
an object of study. 55 It can be studied, however, because victims do often have 
such hopes and these hopes can be integral to how victims see their lives as 
survivors of violence. 
54 See Crawford, .this volume, on the possibility that hope as well as fear can motivate genocidal 
actions. 
55 Some studies that exemplify this diversity are: Lieselotte Viaene, "Life Is Priceless: Mayan 
Q'eqchi' Voices on the Guatemalan National Reparations Program," International Journal of 
' · Transitional Justice 4, no. 1 (2009), 4-25; Simon P. Robins, ''To Live as Other Kenyans Do": 
A Study of Reparative Demands of Kenyan Victims of Human Rights Violations (New York, 
NY: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2011); Dyan Mazurana, Teddy Atim, and 
Helen Kezie-Nwoha, Making Gender-Just Remedy and Reparation Possible: Upholding the 
Rights of Women and Girls in the Greater North of Uganda (Kampala: Isis Women's 
lnternatiof)al Cross Cultural Exchange and Somerville, MA.: Feinstein International 
Center, Tufts University, 2013); Kimberly Theidon, Intimate Enemies: Violence and 
Reconciliation in Peru (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Phuong 
N. Pham and Patrick Vink, Fragile Peace, Elusive Justice: Population-Based Survey on 
Perception and Attitudes about Security and Justice in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Humanitarian lnitiativ~, Harvard School of Public Health, Brigham and 
Women's Hospital, 2014). Stories from a post-genocide socio-therapy storytelling project for 
Rwandan women survivors movingly illustrate both the difficulties and the possibilities of 
reviving hope and the women's ideas about justice. See Annemiek Richters et al., "Of Death 
and Rebirth: Life Histories of Rwandan Female Genocide Survivors," Torture 24, 
Supplementum 1 (2014), 6-57. On the psychological and moral complexity of victims' situa-
tions, see Brandon Hamber; Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, 
Reconciliation, and Mental Health (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009). 
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That individuals and groups can sustain hopes for justice through a lifetime 
and down generations is a fact as familiar as it is remarkable, whether in the 
decades of walking of the Madres in the Plaza de Mayo or the 60-year process 
in which the Taos Pueblo people actually reclaimed their sacred Blue Lake. 
The Lakota have continued to seek to regain their sacred ground in the Black 
Hills for more than a century. If injuries and trauma have intergenerational 
impact, so to do the hopes that can arise and survive in their wake. 
GENOCIDE, CULTURAL DEVASTATION, AND RADICAL HOPE 
I have suggested that the picture of relentless hopelessness is as unhelpful as 
that of cheery denial or misplaced triumphalism. Here I consider another idea 
about the limits of hope after the devastation of genocide or other catastrophic 
violence. The philosopher Jonathan Lear argues that even when all particular 
hopes are placed beyond reach by the collapse of a culture there is yet a special 
transcendental form of hope that might survive and serve as a bridge to the 
future. In his book Radical Hope, Lear explores the "act of radical anticipa-
tion" that may still be possible when a people have lost their concepts under 
conditions of cultural collapse.56 He tells the story of the Crow people of the 
American plains under the leadership of their great chief Plenty Coups during 
the events that led to their confinement to a reservation. Lear is drawn to 
a remark recorded by a white man to whom Plenty Coups chose to tell his 
story.57 Plenty Coups is cited as saying that after the buffalo went away, "the 
hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. 
After this nothing happened."58 Lear's interpretation is that with the collapse 
ofa culture as a system of meanings that gives significance to events, it is not 
only that the Crow way of life had ended but that the point of view in which 
anything that happened had significance or made sense for the Crow as 
a distinct people had collapsed. Even as the life of Crows goes on, the events 
are "not genuine happenings" for the Crow, nor are the possibilities of living 
by and living up to Crow ideals any longer coherent.59 
Lear does not speak of genocide; instead, he repeatedly refers to "cultural 
collapse," devastation, or catastrophe. The story of the Crow is one of removal 
to a reservation in ·the 1880s (so, as with other American Indian peoples, from 
some or all of their land) and ensuing destitution and mass death from disease 
6 . 
5 Lear, Radical Hope , 78. 
57 The book to which Lear refers is Frank B. Linderman, Plenty-Coups: Chief of the Crows 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), now available in a second edition. 
58 Lear, Radical Hope, 2. 59 Lear, Radical Hope, 40 and 43. 
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epidemics (one-third of the Crow died in the 1890s). The US government then 
embarked on policies to break up tribal lands, break intergenerational ties by 
removing children to schools with a relentless assimilationist regime, and 
outlaw and extinguish Native American religious practices and languages. 
These historical processes arguably encompass many specifically genocidal 
acts.60 Lear's interest is in the inherent human possibility in which the tools to 
conceptualize, consider, and project possibilities are lost as the conditions for 
continuing a way of life are destroyed. He suggests that the Crow might be 
understood as surviving the cultural catastrophe through radical hope, hope 
"directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to 
understand what it is."61 This involves a complex story about how Plenty 
Coups was able to draw guidance, despite its indeterminacy and vagueness, 
from a prophetic childhood dream that instructed the Crow to survive not by 
continuing to fight but by learning from others. The Crow allied with the 
United States against their traditional enemies, the Sioux. Although the Crow 
did not escape confinement to a reservation and later encroachments by the 
United States, Lear recounts that the Crow remain proud of retaining their 
land and being able to say that they were not defeated.62 They did not know 
what their future good would be, but they were guided by Plenty Coups' 
conviction that they could survi~e as a people in search of that good. 
Lear's book does something unusual and admirable in academic philoso-
phy, making the situation and experience of a Native American people and 
their leader into exemplars of human possibility, though Lear repeatedly 
denies that his .is the story of what actually happened to the Crow. It is 
a speculative story that illustrates a peculiar vulnerability of human beings 
from infancy: we reach out toward a source of goodness that we as yet lack the 
concepts to understand. 63 Lear's account is moving, but it is highly question-
able, both in the assumption that the only hope available for human beings at 
6o The use of_the term "genocide" to describe the treatment of indigenous peoples or specific 
policies directed at them in the Americas, Australia, and Canada, is a topic of disagreement. 
and controversy, despite the fact that many government policies do seem to be explicitly 
covered under the official definition of genocide in the UN Convention and the Rome 
Statute. It is not only non-indigenous citizens who question this usage. See, for example, 
Joseph P. Gone, "Colonial Genocide and Historical Trauma in Native North America: 
Complicating Contemporary Attributions," in Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North 
America, ed. Alexander L. Hinton, Andrew Woolford, and Jeff Benvenuto (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2014), 273-291, who questions whether "genocide" in fact characterizes 
"the overarching pattern" of European dispossession of indigenous peoples in North America. 
See also other essays in this volume for a nuanced view of what constitutes genocide, with 
a focus on indigenous peoples. 
61 Lear, Radical Hope, 103. 62 Lear, Radical Hope, 136. 63 Lear, Radical Hope, 122. 
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extremity is some unusual "radical" sort of hope and in the claims (even if 
hypothetical) that Lear makes about the Crow (and possibly by implication 
other Native American peoples) in order to illustrate the need for and possi-
bility of radical hope. 
Lear is not alone in believing that cases of extreme collapse of human hopes 
require the postulation of a special or superordinate form of hope. Matthew 
Ratcliffe identifies Lear's radical hope as "a general orientation or sense of how 
things are with the world in the context of which intentional states of the kind 
'I hope that p' are possible," what he calls "pre-intentional hope."64 Unlike 
Lear, Ratcliffe believes that pre-intentional hope is always with us and not only 
a resource in extremity; it is a background condition for forming our particular 
intentional hopes, "a general sense that things might tum out for the good."65 
Ratcliffe believes, and Lear presumably must as well, that even pre-intentional 
or radical hope itself might fail, whether for individuals (Ratcliffe) or in whole 
communities (Lear). The shared view here is that hopes in the usual sense 
require well-defined intentional objects, clearly conceived particular states of 
affairs that the hopes are about. On this view, dramatic losses of particular 
hopes, then, might be met by some sort of special higher-order hope that 
allows us to hold open the space for particular hopes with the vague sense that 
"something good will emerge." This, however, seems to be a mistake. We do 
not need to postulate a condition for the possibility of hopes that is itself 
a superordinate hope, such as Lear's radical hope or Ratcliffe's pre-intentional 
hope. Instead, as I have suggested, an analysis of hope in the usual sense 
unpacks the conditions for its possibility and sustenance: desire, a sense of an 
ope,n future, a belief in possibility, and the ability to be energized and directed 
in thought and possibly to action. Nor is this merely a conceptual point. When 
people are rendered hopeless, including by the ill-treatment or indifference of 
others, what is practically necessary in order to confront avoidable hopeless-
ness (or to appreciate unavoidable losses of hope) is not another concept, but 
an understanding of what concrete conditions of hope have been destroyed for 
them or put beyond their reach. 
Particular hopes and the ability to go on forming and sustaining hopes will 
be extinguished if one has been crushed or numbed beyond desiring; if one no 
longer sees a future, or one that is open to certain possibilities; or if one is 
demoralized or terrorized into inertness or helplessness. These conditions 
might occur; and particular hopes might be defeated or blocked, when one 
64 Matthew Ratcliffe, "What Is It to Lose Hope?," Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 12, no. 4 
(2013), 597-614, here 603. · 
65 Ratcliffe, "What Is It to Lose Hope?," 604. 
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experiences grief, terror, trauma, or illness; a catastrophic loss of hope does 
indeed seem possible under these conditions, at least for individuals, whether 
temporary or longer term. 66 There seems to be no reason to postulate 
a peculiar form of hope to explain the possibility of transcending hopelessness, 
once conditions for hope are understood; one instead needs to ·understand 
conditions of cognitive, conative, or affective collapse or blockage, local or 
global, that might be reversed. Nor should one be misled into thinking that the 
absence of a specific object of hope means that one cannot hope. Hope is 
cognitively flexible, and can feed on the ability to imagine a future under some 
description that matches something one desires. It is quite possible to hope for 
"better times," "a second chance," "something good to happen," or "a better 
future for the ones that follow." Vague hopes are hopes all the same; they are 
not without content, but have underdetermined content that can be realized 
in varied and even unanticipated ways. Finally, one must not make the 
mistake of thinking that one only hopes in those cases where one believes 
what is hoped for is open to effort. Being defeated or stymied or stumped does 
not preclude hoping, as long as desire persists, imagination is enlivened, and 
the future seems open to what one desires. Stan van Hooft believes that hope 
has the psychological structure of "supplication," a sense of appealing to 
something beyond oneself that might help.67 
Lear's account of the Crow should also give us pause. First, Lear's char-
. acterization of the "Crow way of life" is reductive in a way that simply could 
not be right for any human culture. When Lear says that "in traditional Crow 
life, everything counted either as hunting or :fighting or as preparing to hunt or 
fight," we have reason to doubt that this could portray the way of life of 
,q recognizably human group, with its complex history, its layered collective 
memories and myths, its varied culturally defined roles, social positions, and 
practices, and its history of exposure to other groups' ways. 68 Second, Lear does 
not really mean to say that the Crow ceased to live in time when the buffalo 
went away and they were confined to a reservation. Lear says that "the 
members · of the Crow tribe still inhabited some minimal form of 
temporality."69 More tellingly, he goes on to describe the "historical 
66 Ratcliffe, "What Is It to Lose Hope?" 605ff. contains a valuable discussion of different ways in 
which pre-intentional or radical hope-might fail. I am suggesting that these can be explained 
without recourse to the notion of radical hope. 
67 van Hooft, Hope, 37. 
68 Lear, Radical Hope, 40. Lear mentions the possibility that the Crow were pastoralists before 
becoming a nomadic hunting tribe ( 99). If so, the form of life that collapsed at the end of the 
nineteenth century was not the only source of Crow tradition, practice, and self-understand-
ing. 
69 Lear, Radical Hope, 41. 
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vindication" of the Crow who, still under the leadership of Plenty Coups, 
continued for decades to lobby the US government for favorable policies, 
especially concerning their land. 70 It seems the Crow persisted with 
a motivating sense of a desired future possibility that characterizes hope. 
None of this is to deny that the Crow suffered devastating injuries to their 
way of life. While the Crow survived and held some of their land, many 
Native peoples were exterminated or lost land, language, and many basic 
intergenerational continuities of memory, custom, craft, ritual, and 
practice. The cultural injuries may in many cases be correctly .described 
as devastation or even catastrophe, although the specific histories of 
particular Indian people and the stories of loss, choice, or change that 
they have to tell deserve to be considered in detail. Disturbingly, Lear's 
image of a culture that vanishes without a trace uncomfortably echoes the 
persisting trope of the "vanishing" Indian so deeply and purposefully 
ingrained in the imaginations of other Americans. Yet Lear's own story is 
one of a people 's persistence and the continuing pursuit as a people of some 
central goals. It is hard to see why we should not see Crow people as 
managing to sustain, despite extreme shocks to their culture and popula-
tion, some shared hopes about the way of life they were in fact continuing, 
even if they had lost a very great deal, and to see the emergence from those 
very losses as the focus of some of their hopes. 
There is no denying that Native Americans are among the most disadvan-
taged populations in the United States. The well-documented problems of 
poverty, inadequate housing and education, high rates of suicide, early mor-
tal_ity, alcoholism, chronic illness, and violence should raise alarms about their 
current conditions and continuing histories, as well as those of other indigen-
ous groups. These conditions can be seen as effects or symptoms of some kinds 
of hopelessness in some individuals and possibly in shared lives.71 Given the 
ubiquity and importance of hope in human life, pervasive patterns of hope-
lessness or diminished or embattled hope are urgent moral problems likely to 
be explained by conditions that include gross failures of justice in the present 
as in the past that have blunted people's desires or their senses of possibility or 
agency. To argue that hope can persist is not to deny that the conditions of 
hope may be imperiled or extinguished. Yet many Native communities and 
populations have survived, physically and culturally, and in many cases 
revived. I . do not think we can understand this resilience without the 
· 7° Lear, Radical Hope, 136ff. 
7
' Charles Lyons, "Suicides Spread through a· Brazilian Tribe," New York Times Qanuary 4, 
2015). 
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persistence of everyday hopes for better lives as well as hopes for understanding 
and justice. 
It is true that we should not assume that particular ideas of "understanding" 
or "justice" map on unproblematically to those of the people in question. Nor, 
for that matter, should we assume that the categories of desire, possibility, the 
future,-and energized agency that I have used to explain hoping are the ways 
all people will understand the phenomenon of hope, given their own concep-
tions of time, history, personality, humanity, power, and action. What we can 
assume is that the drive to survive as a people under concerted attempts at 
removal, extermination, and assimilation, and to struggle to maintain and 
revitalize one's culture, cannot be explained without the persistence for many 
of the kind of affective orientation we call "hope." So, too, do the long and 
often disappointing, yet continuing histories of seeking self-determination and 
reclaiming stolen land and sacred objects provide evidence of hope in both its 
aspect of patient biding and active pursuit. 72 
CONCLUSION: HOPE MATTERS 
Why does hope after genocid~ matter? Why have I undertaken to displace 
assumptions that hope in all of its operations - everyday hopes, hopes for 
understanding, and hopes for justice - is foreclosed or irrelevant in the after-
math of genocide? Ultimately, it is because that assumption itself, neither 
inevitable nor realistic, is de-individualizing and potentially dehumanizing. 
Our hopes reveal not simply what we want, but how our powers of attention, 
imagination, and motivation can be captured and steered in distinctive, and 
p~rhaps singular and surprising, ways. If hope is deeply characteristic of 
human agency, expresses our human subjective orientation in time, and 
underpins normal moral and social relations, to see hope as foreclosed for 
some people is to view them as humanly diminished. Similarly, the assump-
tion of the need for radical hope might bypass the everyday humanity of some 
people whose humanity has itself been discounted by genocidal treatment, by 
failing to allow for their individual powers of imagination and the complexity 
of the practical and symbolic resources of their ways of life. It slights the 
human subjectivity that compels them to hope for truth and justice. 
I do not deny that genocide survivors may indeed live in that space beyond 
all hopes. Not only despair, but simple resignation and a diminished 
72 See, for example, Jeffrey Ostler, The Lakotas and the Black Hills (New York, NY: Penguin, 
2010), a compact and careful history of the continuous hope of the Lakota to hold and later to 
regain the Black Hills over more than a century. 
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investment in the future are possibilities. But it is certain that not all survivors 
live in that space and it is possible that some of them may transit over time 
from ravaged or stunned hopelessness to some specific and emotionally 
sustaining hopes. Nor is it true that all hopes are good for those who sustain 
them or for others. The content of some hopes is morally unsavory. 
The pursuit of some hopes can be foolish, harmful to one's own interests, or 
the cause of indefensible expense to others. In lives devastated by violence or 
by historical legacies of profound mistreatment, however, everyday hopes for 
a safe, decent, or better life, or hopes for understanding and justice are not 
morally objectionable or unwise. Such hopes can be the basis of renewed 
investment in individual and shared projects, including moral and political 
projects of seeking truth and justice and social and spiritual commitments to 
reclaiming communities and culture. It is survivors and heirs of genocide, not 
we observers, who will be the judge of what they can and do hope for. 
